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the breaking of IBM’s monopoly for mainframe computers and DRAM chips by the five Japanese electronic firms in the 1970’s, which had developed alternative technologies through pre-competitive research cooperation and reaped massive “Schumpeterian profits” from the micro-electronic revolution spreading through all industrial sectors by the 1980’s |
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the software revolution carried by American enterprises such as Compaq, Apple und Microsoft, which lead to the global diffusion of personal computers and to functional interaction with the mastery of microelectronics by Japanese enterprises resulting in the creation of the new industrial sector of “information technology”. |
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export-substituting direct investments of Japanese Automobile producers in the US and Europe to avoid protectionist reactions to massive imports of automobiles from Japan |
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direct investments of German firms in Japan to make use of their own patented technologies such as Merck KgaA’s liquid crystals in end products such as flat screens produced and globally commercialized by Japanese firms. |
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direct investment of producers of European high end luxury firms in Japan, such as France’s Louis Vuitton and Germany’s Meissner Porzellan, Lange&Söhne Glashütter Uhren, Wellendorff Jewellers, Hugo Boss, in order to take advantage of the high purchasing power of Japanese consumers |
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direct investments of producers of mature industrial products such as Robert Bosch in Japan by friendly takeovers of former licensee firms in Japan as a strategy of long-term market penetration. |
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the early commitment of a select group of forward looking German firms to the German Year in Japan 2005-2006, such as Bayer, Daimler Chrysler, DePfA, Lufthansa, MerckKGaA, Porsche, SAP, Thyssen-Krupp, TÜVRheinland, which gave them a unique opportunity for a strategy of advertising through “holistic branding” by funding and organizing cultural and scientific events with broad appeal in the Japanese public |